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FILED IN THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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JAMES R. LARSEN, CLERK
DEPUTY
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SPOKANE

12 RONALD R. WAMBOLT, on behalf of
13 himself and all others similarly situated,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 AVISTA CORP., THOMAS M.
17 MATTHEWS, GARY ELY and JON E.
18 ELIASSEN,

19 Defendants.
20

No. CS-02-0328-FVS

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

21 Plaintiff, by his undersigned attorneys, individually and on behalf of the Class
22 described below, upon information and belief, based upon, *inter alia*, the investigation
23 of counsel, which includes, among other things, a review of public announcements
24 made by defendants, Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings made by
25 defendants, press releases, reports of securities analysts, and media reports, except as
26 to the paragraph applicable to the named plaintiffs which is alleged upon personal

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS

- 1 -

1 knowledge, brings this complaint (the "Complaint") against defendants named herein,
 2 and alleges as follows:

3 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

4 1. This is a securities class action alleging violations of the federal
 5 securities laws and in connection with misstatements and omissions of material fact
 6 regarding Avista Corp. ("Avista" or the "Company") by the defendants named herein.
 7 In particular, during the class period hereinafter defined, defendants omitted to
 8 disclose the following crucial facts regarding risky business practices that Avista was
 9 engaging in with Enron Power Marketing Inc. (hereinafter "Enron") and its
 10 subsidiary, Pacific General Electric Co. (PG&E"), including:

- 11 • That Avista was engaged in highly risky energy trading activities with
 12 Enron and PG&E involving so-called "Ricochet" or "megawatt
 13 laundering" trades in which Avista acted as a middleman between Enron
 14 and PG&E so that Enron could evade California's caps on electric power
 15 prices and charge California artificially high prices for electricity;
- 16 • That Avista routinely acted as a middleman between affiliates such as
 17 Enron and PG&E in order to facilitate transactions to proceed which
 18 would have been prohibited under federal rules if the affiliates had
 19 engaged in them without an intermediary;
- 20 • That Avista's reported revenues from its energy trading and wholesale
 21 purchase and sale of electric power during the Class Period were not
 22 sustainable because they were derived in part from Avista's role in
 23 "Ricochet" transactions and other Enron trading schemes that had no
 24 economic purpose other than to "game" the California power market; and
- 25 • That Avista was and is exposed to substantial contingent legal liabilities
 26 as a result of the foregoing, including the threatened revocation of its

1 license to trade electric power on the wholesale markets, or market-based
 2 rate authority, by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"
 3 or the "Commission").

4 2. When Wall Street began to learn the truth regarding the foregoing on
 5 June 5, 2002 after FERC issued an order finding that Avista had failed to cooperate
 6 with FERC's investigation into manipulation of the California power markets during
 7 2000 and ordered Avista to show cause why its authority to sell electric power at
 8 market-based rates should not be revoked as a result of Avista's failure to comply with
 9 the Commission-ordered investigation, Avista's stock tumbled 13 percent. On August
 10 14, 2002, after the Commission announced that it may take formal enforcement action
 11 on charges that Avista helped manipulate California power prices during 2000, Avista
 12 stock tumbled 11.85 percent, and on September 17, 2002 Avista stock traded at as low
 13 as \$11.10 per share, down from its class period high of \$67.55.

14 JURISDICTION

15 3. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant
 16 to § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") (15 U.S.C.
 17 § 78aa) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

18 4. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
 19 Exchange Act as amended (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 78t(a)) and Rule 10b-5
 20 promulgated thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5), and the common law. Venue is
 21 proper in this District because defendant Avista conducts business and maintains its
 22 primary place of business in this District, and because certain of the wrongful acts
 23 alleged herein took place or originated in this District.

24 5. In connection with the acts alleged in this Complaint, defendants, directly
 25 or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including,
 26

1 but not limited to, the mails, interstate telephone communications and the facilities of
2 the national securities markets.

3 **PARTIES**

4 6. Plaintiff Ronald R. Wambolt ("Plaintiff") purchased shares of Avista at
5 artificially inflated prices as set forth on Schedule "A" hereto and was damaged
6 thereby.

7 7. Defendant Avista Corporation, an energy company involved in the
8 generation, transmission and distribution of energy, as well as other energy-related
9 businesses, is a Washington corporation having its principal place of business at 1411
10 East Mission Avenue, Spokane, Washington. The Company's stock trades in an
11 efficient market on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol "AVA".

12 8. Defendant Thomas M. Matthews formerly served at times relevant hereto
13 as Avista's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer before resigning in November
14 2000.

15 9. Defendants Gary Ely and Jon E. Eliassen currently serve as Avista's
16 Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively.
17 Defendants Matthews, Ely and Eliassen are hereinafter sometimes collectively
18 referred to as the "Individual Defendants."

19 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

20 10. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and
21 (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of all
22 persons who purchased, converted, exchanged or otherwise acquired the common
23 stock of Avista between November 23, 1999 and August 13, 2002, inclusive (the
24 "Class Period") and were damaged thereby (the "Class").
25
26

11. Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Specifically:

(a) There were 47,682,357 shares of Avista stock issued and outstanding as of March 19, 2002; and

(b) While the exact number of Class members is unknown to plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, plaintiff believes that there are thousands of Class members who acquired Avista stock during the Class Period.

12. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have sustained damages because of defendants' unlawful activities alleged herein. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation and intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by plaintiff. Plaintiff has no interests which are contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class that plaintiff seeks to represent.

13. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

14. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

(a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by defendants' acts as alleged herein;

(b) whether defendants misstated and/or omitted to state material facts in their public statements and filings with the SEC;

(c) whether defendants participated directly or indirectly in the course of conduct complained of herein; and

(d) whether the members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of defendants' conduct and the proper measure of such damages.

DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT COURSE OF CONDUCT

A. November 23, 1999-May 8, 2002: Avista Embarks Upon an Undisclosed and Highly Risky Course of Business by Acting As A Middleman In "Ricochet" or "Megawatt Laundering" Transactions Involving Enron and PG&E

15. Avista is an energy company involved in the generation, transmission and distribution of energy, as well as other energy-related businesses. After joining the company (from Houston-based power trader Dynegy) on July 1, 1998, defendant Matthews tried to transform a sleepy utility company known as The Washington Water Power Company into Avista— a national player in what was thought to be the emerging business of energy trading. Under Matthews' leadership The Washington Water Power Company opened trading offices in Houston and Boston, slashed its dividend, and changed its name to Avista. These initiatives proved to be too ambitious, however, and by late-1999 Avista claimed to be retrenching itself as a regional utility company. The company stated in a November 23, 1999 press release:

SPOKANE, WASH: Avista Corp. (NYSE:AVA) affiliate Avista Energy today announced a redirection of its focus away from national energy trading toward a more regionally based energy marketing and trading effort backed by physical assets. Costs to effect the transition are estimated to be between \$10 million and \$15 million dollars and will be reflected in normal expenses during the next six months. The company is presently evaluating a number of options including the sale of a portion of the business. The move toward regionally focused energy-marketing activities follows significant changes in the overall energy trading and marketing industry that have created low margins while requiring higher levels of investment, credit commitments

and value-at-risk limits. Mergers and consolidations within the industry have also created a small number of large players and a marketplace where liquidity has decreased and volatility has risen.

16. Thus, as of late-1999 and early-2000, investors were led to believe that Avista was returning to a lower-risk, more conservative business approach in line with its history as a traditional public utility. Avista summarized its new regional focus as follows in its Annual Report for 1999 filed with the SEC on March 17, 2000 as follows:

Regionally. The Company plans to concentrate on growing its telecommunications and fiber optic business as part of its overall strategic focus on generating shareholder value. In addition, the Company plans to add to its regulated and non-regulated energy-related assets on a regional basis as the industry consolidates to further optimize its assets and create greater economies of scale. The growth is expected to be driven by the Company's significant base of knowledge and experience in the operation of physical systems - for both electric energy and natural gas - in the region, as well as its relationship-focused approach to the customer. [1999 Form 10-K p. 1.]

The company modestly described its risk factors as follows:

The Company's growth strategy exposes it to risks, including risks associated with rapid expansion, challenges in recruiting and retaining qualified personnel, risks associated with acquisitions and joint ventures, and increasing competition. In addition, the energy trading and marketing business exposes the Company to the financial and credit risks associated with commodity trading activities. The Company believes that its extensive experience in the electric and natural gas business, coupled with its strong management team, will allow the Company to effectively manage its further development as a diversified energy, information and technology company. [1999 10-K p. 1.]

17. Unbeknownst to investors, Avista was about to embark upon a reckless course of business involving highly risky energy trading activities with Enron and

1 PG&E involving so-called "Ricochet" or "megawatt laundering" trades in which
2 Avista acted as a middleman between Enron and PG&E so that Enron could evade
3 California's caps on electric power prices and charge California artificially high prices
4 for electricity. In such trades Avista routinely acted as a middleman between affiliates
5 such as Enron and PG&E in order to facilitate transactions to proceed which would
6 have been prohibited under federal rules if the affiliates had engaged in them without
7 an intermediary.

8 18. During the year 2000 an apparent shortage of power wreaked havoc on
9 California's economy, causing occasional unpredicted blackouts and rolling
10 interruptions of power. At the time, such interruptions in the power supply were
11 attributed to excessive regulation of intrastate power prices by California regulators,
12 insatiable demand from a growing population of Californians, and/or the Clinton
13 Administration's tougher licensing requirements that made it difficult for power
14 companies to build new power plants. For whatever reason, throughout 2000
15 businesses and consumers in California could not rely on a steady supply of power
16 and instead faced unpredictable periodic blackouts that were both inconvenient and
17 disruptive to business. According to an estimate by Cal. Senator Joseph Dunn, these
18 disruptions resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to the California
19 economy. In addition, power prices in California rose rapidly in late 2000, causing
20 Californians to pay approximately \$10 billion in excess electricity charges.

21 19. However, after the collapse of Enron the public slowly began to find out
22 that, unbeknownst to the market, shortages of power and blackouts in California had
23 not been a result of rampant demand or imprudent regulatory policy. Instead, it
24 developed, many of the shortages and blackouts were caused by market manipulation
25 and the artificial creation of shortages via schemes designed to exploit weaknesses and
26 loopholes in the California power grid. Some of the schemes employed by Enron and

1 others to reap supracompetitive profits even took on nicknames, such as “Deathstar”
 2 (a generic name for a family of schemes that were designed to capture ISO congestion
 3 payments based on imaginary transactions), “Black Widow,” “Red Congo,” “Cong
 4 Catcher,” “Bigfoot” and “Fatboy”.

5 20. During the year 2000 Avista engaged in electric power transactions with
 6 Enron and PG&E having the characteristics of “Ricochet” trades, in which Enron
 7 bought electric power from the California electric grid operator known as the
 8 Independent System Operator (the “ISO”) and sold such power to Avista. Avista
 9 then resold the power to PG&E. Next, PG&E sold the power back to Avista, which
 10 then resold the power back to Enron. Enron in turn sold the power back into
 11 California, usually to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. This chain of
 12 transactions had the effect of enabling Enron to charge California utilities unregulated
 13 market prices for power that Enron had in fact bought *in California at much lower,*
 14 *capped prices* and improperly pocket the difference between the regulated, capped
 15 California prices and unregulated, uncapped market prices. Such transactions are also
 16 known as “megawatt laundering” transactions because, once fungible electric power
 17 originating in California has been laundered through-- or sold to and from-- an out-of-
 18 state utility, it can be sold back into California at higher, unregulated prices.

19 21. At no time prior to May 8, 2002 did Avista reveal the conduct alleged in
 20 ¶ 19, *supra*, to the public or regulators.

21 **B. May 8, 2002-August 13, 2002: Avista Misleads the Federal Energy**
 22 **Regulatory Commission and the Market By Making Misleading and**
 23 **Evasive Public Statements and Written Submissions Regarding Its**
Involvement In “Ricochet” Trades

24 22. In response to a continuing public outcry arising from lingering
 25 suspicions that the California power “crisis” was in reality created by power traders
 26 “gaming” the California power markets, on February 13, 2002 the Federal Energy

1 Regulatory Commission ("FERC") directed a Staff fact-finding investigation into
 2 whether any entity manipulated short-term prices in electric energy or natural gas
 3 markets in the West or otherwise exercised undue influence over wholesale prices in
 4 the West for the period January 1, 2000 forward.

5 23. On May 8, 2002, FERC Staff issued a data request concerning
 6 various trading strategies of sellers of wholesale electricity and/or ancillary services in
 7 the United States portion of the Western System Coordinating Council during 2000-
 8 2001. The specific trading strategies were those identified in three Enron memoranda
 9 that were provided by Enron to the FERC in response to a data request. Among the
 10 sellers to whom the data request was sent were public utilities who were granted
 11 market-based rate authority by the FERC based on a finding that they lacked market
 12 power and there was no evidence of affiliate abuse or reciprocal dealing (including
 13 Avista).

14 24. In response to the FERC request, on May 22, 2002 Avista denied any
 15 involvement in the types of trades set forth in the data request, stating that an
 16 extensive search of Avista's records failed to turn up any pertinent references to
 17 trading practices allegedly carried out by Enron traders to manipulate the California
 18 market. Avista proclaimed itself innocent of any wrongdoing in a May 22, 2002 press
 19 release:

20 SPOKANE, WASH.: Avista Corp. (NYSE:AVA) has
 21 affirmed that the past and present trading activities of both
 22 its utility and unregulated subsidiary have been carried out
 23 in a legitimate and ethical manner. The company has
 24 detailed its position in a response to a Federal Energy
 Regulatory Commission inquiry into trading practices in the
 California energy market during 2000 and 2001.

25 "Avista's actions were legitimate, backed by real energy
 26 assets and did not violate the ISO tariff or any state or
 federal regulations," said Gary G. Ely, chairman, president

1 and chief executive officer of Avista Corp. "Our company's
2 success has been built on decades of experience serving
customers in the western energy markets."

3 25. Unbeknownst to Avista, also in response to the FERC request, PG&E
4 identified certain Enron-related transactions responsive to the FERC request which
5 Avista, in a middleman capacity, had facilitated. PG&E also turned over transcripts of
6 trading activity revealing that Avista personnel were involved in "Ricochet"-type
7 transactions.

8 26. Having learned (based on information provided by PG&E) that Avista
9 had been less than forthcoming in response to the FERC request, on June 4, 2002 the
10 FERC issued an Order finding that Avista and others had failed to cooperate with the
11 FERC investigation and ordered Avista and others to show cause why their authority
12 to charge market-based rates should not be revoked as a result of their failure to
13 comply with the FERC investigation.

14 27. Avista then backtracked, no longer claiming that it had not been involved
15 in any "Ricochet" trades, but instead claiming that it had not *knowingly* withheld any
16 information about such trades. On June 5, 2002 Avista issued a press release stating
17 as follows:

18 "We have not knowingly withheld any information about
19 Avista Utilities' activities related to FERC's request," said
20 Gary G. Ely, chairman, chief executive officer and president
21 of Avista Corp. "We will continue to do everything possible
to cooperate with FERC in this process to provide a
complete and accurate response."

22 In the press release, Avista attributed its failure to identify the questionable
23 transactions identified by PG&E in response to the FERC order to a lack of time to
24 review its records.

25 28. The market was not convinced that Avista was free of exposure on the
26 Enron front, however. On news of the FERC order to show cause, Avista stock

1 tumbled 13 percent. Undeterred, Avista continued to stick to its story that it was not
 2 involved in any wrongdoing. On June 14, 2002, Avista responded to the FERC order
 3 to show cause, claiming in substance that it had failed to locate the "Ricochet" trades
 4 identified by PG&E because, in a letter to Avista, PG&E had not identified any
 5 specific trades, but had only provided Avista with the dates on which the trades
 6 occurred. Avista summarized its involvement in the Enron "Ricochet" trades as
 7 follows:

8 Certainly, had Avista Utilities been able to review all the
 9 transcripts, both its own and PGE's, relating to the
 10 transactions, prior to the deadline for filing the responses to
 11 the May 8 Data Request, Avista Utilities would have been in
 12 a position to provide an additional explanation of the
 13 transactions with PGE and Enron in April, May, and June of
 14 2000. Nonetheless, a close examination of those transactions
 15 reveals conclusively that Avista Utilities was not engaged in
 16 Ricochet transactions, or any other trading strategy specified
 17 in the May 8 Data Request. To the extent that any company
 18 engaged in a "trading strategy" behind the specified
 19 transactions, that company was Enron, engaging in the
 20 practice identified in the data requests as "Death Star."
 21 Avista Utilities, however, was unaware of Enron's intent, did
 22 not participate in the Cal ISO congestion markets which
 23 enable Death Star to work, did not understand the
 24 transactions to be part of a congestion relief schedule.
 25 Instead, Avista Utilities' traders believed they were engaging
 26 in a standard bilateral, buy/sell transaction with Enron and
 PGE in an accommodation to maintain good relations with
 two of Avista Utilities' common trading counterparties.
 [Avista Response to Order to Show Cause, p. 6.]

29. Avista maintained that while its traders had been involved in transactions
 that **Enron** arranged to manipulate the California market, Avista personnel had done
 so only as the unwitting dupes of Enron:

The Avista Utilities transcripts paint the clearest picture of
 what was actually intended by Avista Utilities. Virtually all
 of the transactions in question involved the purchase of
 energy by Avista Utilities from Enron at Malin, and then a

1 resale of that same energy to PGE at Malin. The resale to
 2 PGE almost always included an add-on of a small buy/sell
 3 fee (either \$0.25 or \$1.00 per MWh) to compensate Avista
 4 Utilities for its 13 role in the transactions. The Avista
 5 Utilities' transcripts plainly demonstrate that the Avista
 6 Utilities traders that consummated the transactions simply
 7 believed that they were helping accommodate a transaction
 8 between Enron and PGE, a standard industry practice known
 9 as a "sleeve". There are many legitimate reasons in a liquid
 10 trading market that cause two counterparties to seek out a
 11 third party to accommodate a transaction by stepping into
 12 the middle with a buy/sell arrangement and to "sleeve" the
 13 transaction. The most common reasons relate to internal
 14 corporate trading policies and creditworthiness problems.
 15 Avista Utilities' traders were simply trying to accommodate
 16 two other entities, PGE and Enron, that were common
 17 trading partners with Avista Utilities, and to maintain the
 18 type of good relations that are important among buyers and
 19 sellers in the Pacific Northwest markets.

20 The transcripts demonstrate further that the transactions
 21 were initiated solely by Enron, and that Avista Utilities
 22 provided no transmission associated with the transactions
 23 nor did it acquire any transmission. Finally, and perhaps
 24 most importantly, the transcripts show conclusively that
 25 there was no awareness on the part of Avista Utilities'
 26 traders about what, if any, strategy Enron was engaged in,
 the purpose behind the buy/sell requests, how Enron's
 strategies worked, nor even why Enron and PGE selected
 Avista Utilities to undertake this buy/sell. It is imperative
 that the Commission examine the transcripts of Avista
 Utilities' tape recordings in isolation from the other materials
 now available in this proceeding (including the transcript
 materials from PGE of other conversations related to the
 same transactions). The Avista Utilities transcripts related to
 the transactions are included in their entirety as Attachment
 A to this answer, and demonstrate Avista Utilities' limited
 understanding of these buy/sell transactions with 14 Enron
 and PGE and the lack of knowledge by Avista Utilities of
 whatever Enron was doing. They demonstrate that Avista
 Utilities was not engaged in any of the Enron strategies
 through these transactions. [Avista Response to Order to
 Show Cause, pp. 13-14.]

30. The FERC quite simply did not buy Avista's explanation. On August 13, 2002, FERC issued an Order Initiating Investigation, and Establishing Hearing Procedures and Refund Effective Date. The FERC commented as follows:

In its answer to Staff's initial data request of May 8, 2002, concerning various trading strategies, Avista did not admit to involvement in any of the trading strategies. In response to the Show Cause Order, Avista now admits that, in a middleman capacity, it facilitated certain transactions identified by [PG&E] in [PG&E's] response.... In fact, Avista states that it routinely acted as a middleman between affiliates such as [Enron affiliate] EPMI and [PG&E] in order to allow transactions to proceed which would be forbidden to undertake directly....

While admitting that this was part of its standard business practice... Avista made no attempt to go beyond the discrete transactions previously revealed by [PG&E]. Avista argues that, because its tapes cannot be reviewed by electronic search methods, "there was no way for Avista Utilities to conduct any kind of meaningful review of all, or even a portion, of the telephone conversations in its possession and no way to focus such a review."

* * * *

Avista claims that it was "used" unwittingly by Enron. However, this is not reconcilable with Avista's acknowledged practice of acting as an affiliate go-between as a routine matter. Nor are we convinced that, without electronic search methods, it is incapable of coming forth with a thorough analysis of its own activities. This is in share contrast to many other entities that made a considerable effort to provide full and complete responses...

31. The FERC submitted these conclusions to the U.S. Congress, adding that Avista had been "less than forthcoming." The market once again reacted drastically. On August 14, 2002, after the Commission announced that it may take formal enforcement action on charges that Avista helped manipulate California power prices during 2000, Avista stock tumbled 11.85 percent, and on September 17, 2002 Avista

1 stock traded at as low as \$11.10 per share, down from its class period high of **\$67.55**.
 2 FERC summarized the situation as follows: "If the Enron companies, El Paso Electric
 3 or Avista are found to have violated federal law, the commission could revoke their
 4 market-based rate authority... [i]f any of the companies are found to have violated a
 5 FERC rule, regulation, tariff or order, they may be ordered to disgorge any profits
 6 obtained while engaging in the prohibited activities."

7 **MISSTATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS OF MATERIAL FACTS**

8 32. During the Class Period hereinafter defined, defendants omitted to
 9 disclose crucial facts regarding risky business practices that Avista was engaging in
 10 with Enron Power Marketing and its subsidiary PG&E, including:

- 11 • That Avista was engaged in highly risky energy trading activities with
 12 Enron and PG&E involving so-called "Ricochet" or "megawatt
 13 laundering" trades in which Avista acted as a middleman between Enron
 14 and PG&E so that Enron could evade California's caps on electric power
 15 prices and charge California artificially high prices for electricity;
- 16 • That Avista routinely acted as a middleman between affiliates such as
 17 Enron and PG&E in order to facilitate transactions to proceed which
 18 would have been prohibited under federal rules if the affiliates had
 19 engaged in them without an intermediary;
- 20 • That Avista's reported revenues from its energy trading and wholesale
 21 purchase and sale of electric power during the Class Period were not
 22 sustainable because they were derived in part from Avista's role in
 23 "Ricochet" transactions and other Enron trading schemes that had no
 24 economic purpose other than to "game" the California power market; and
- 25 • That Avista was and is exposed to substantial contingent legal liabilities
 26 as a result of the foregoing, including the threatened revocation of its

license to trade electric power on the wholesale markets, or market-based rate authority, by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

In addition, defendants made affirmative statements regarding Avista in its press releases and elsewhere as alleged herein which were materially misleading in light of defendants' omissions to state the material facts set forth in this paragraph.

STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR

33. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking statements does not apply here as the false statements alleged herein were not forward-looking.

FRAUD ON THE MARKET

34. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that:

(a) Defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts during the Class Period regarding Avista as alleged herein;

(b) The omissions and misrepresentations were material;

(c) During the Class Period, Avista's common stock was traded on a developed national stock exchange, namely the New York Stock Exchange, which is an open and efficient market;

(d) Avista filed periodic reports with the SEC;

(e) Avista was followed by securities analysts;

(f) The market rapidly assimilated information about Avista that was publicly available and communicated by the foregoing means and that information was promptly reflected in the price of Avista's common stock; and

(g) The misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein would tend to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of Avista's common stock.

SCIENTER

35. The Individual Defendants acted with scienter in that they knew that statements issued and disseminated by Avista were materially false and misleading, or that the statements therein were made and distributed with reckless disregard for facts that Avista either knew or should have known. The Individual Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such misleading statements would be distributed and disseminated to the investing public, and substantially participated in and/or acquiesced in the issuance and dissemination of such statements in violation of the federal securities laws. Specifically, defendants knew or recklessly disregarded, and omitted to disclose, that Avista was engaging in risky and improper business practices involving “Ricochet” trades.

36. The Individual Defendants either knew that such statements were false and misleading or acted with reckless disregard of such falsity since, as senior officers of Avista, the Individual Defendants knew (or alternatively had free and unfettered access to materials that would have revealed), *inter alia*, that Avista was engaging in risky and improper business practices. If the Individual Defendants did not have actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions alleged, then they were reckless in failing to obtain such knowledge by deliberately refraining from taking those steps necessary to discover same.

37. The Individual Defendants also had substantial economic motives to conceal the true facts regarding Avista’s accounting, including the following. By concealing such facts, the Individual Defendants were able to artificially inflate the value of their own substantial holdings in Avista stock.

**AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 AND RULE 10B-5 PROMULGATED THEREUNDER**

38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

39. During the Class Period, the defendants carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (a) deceive the investing public, including plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; (b) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of Avista common stock; and (c) cause plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Avista stock at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, defendants took the actions set forth herein.

40. Defendants: (a) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (c) engaged in acts, practices and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company's common stock in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Avista common stock in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. All defendants are sued as primary participants in the wrongdoing alleged.

41. In addition to the duties of full disclosure imposed on defendants as a result of their making of affirmative statements and reports, or participation in the making of affirmative statements and reports to the investing public, defendants had a duty to promptly disseminate truthful information that would be material to investors in compliance with the integrated disclosure provisions of the SEC as embodied in SEC Regulations S-X (17 C.F.R. § 210.01 *et seq.*) and S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.10 *et seq.*) and other SEC regulations, including accurate and truthful information with respect to the Company's operations and business practices so that the market prices

1 of the Company's publicly traded securities would be based on truthful, complete and
2 accurate information.

3 42. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the
4 use of means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged
5 and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material
6 information about Avista and its operations and business practices, as set forth more
7 particularly herein, and engaged in practices and a course of business which operated
8 as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of Avista securities during the Class Period.

9 43. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and
10 omissions of material facts set forth herein, or acted with reckless disregard for the
11 truth in that they failed to ascertain and to disclose such facts, even though such facts
12 were readily available to them.

13 44. Defendants' material misrepresentations and/or omissions were made
14 knowingly or recklessly and for the purpose and effect of artificially inflating the
15 market price of Avista stock.

16 45. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading
17 information and failure to disclose material facts, as set forth above, the market price
18 of Avista' common stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In
19 ignorance of the fact that the market price of Avista shares was artificially inflated,
20 and relying directly or indirectly on the false and misleading statements made by
21 defendants, or upon the integrity of the market in which the securities trade, and/or the
22 absence of material adverse information that was known to or recklessly disregarded
23 by defendants but not disclosed in public statements by the defendants during the
24 Class Period, plaintiff and the other members of the Class acquired Avista common
25 stock during the Class Period at artificially inflated prices and were damaged thereby.
26

46. At the time of said misrepresentations and omissions, plaintiff and other members of the Class were ignorant of their falsity, and believed them to be true. Had plaintiff and the other members of the Class and the marketplace known that the price of Avista shares had been artificially inflated by defendants' actions, plaintiff and other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired their Avista securities during the Class Period, or, if they had acquired such securities during the Class Period, they would not have done so at the artificially inflated prices that they paid.

47. By virtue of the foregoing wrongful conduct by defendants, plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company's securities during the Class Period.

**AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 20(A)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**

48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein, including the allegations of *scienter* set forth at ¶¶ 35 through 37, *supra*.

49. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Avista within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high-level positions, and their ownership and contractual rights, and participation in and/or awareness of the Avista' operations, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of Avista, including the wrongful acts alleged herein.

50. The Individual Defendants, by reason of their high-level positions, were at times relevant hereto the controlling persons of Avista and had the power and influence to cause, and did cause, Avista to engage in the conduct complained of

1 herein. Thus, the Individual Defendants controlled the public dissemination of the
2 false and misleading information alleged herein and were culpable participants in the
3 wrongful conduct alleged herein.

4 51. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had, at times relevant
5 hereto, direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of Avista and,
6 therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence certain of the
7 particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations alleged herein, and
8 exercise the same. Such transactions included, without limitation, Avista's issuance
9 and dissemination of misleading statements and omissions in its public filings with the
10 SEC and otherwise and elsewhere.

11 52. As set forth above, defendants each violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
12 their acts and omissions as alleged in this Complaint. By virtue of their positions as
13 controlling persons of defendant Avista, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant
14 to § 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of defendants'
15 wrongful conduct, plaintiff and the Class suffered damages in connection with their
16 purchases of Avista common stock.

17 **JURY DEMAND**

18 53. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.

19 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

20 **WHEREFORE**, plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Class,
21 prays for judgment as follows:

22 A. Declaring this action to be a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and
23 (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and certifying plaintiff as class
24 representative of the Class and his counsel as class counsel;
25
26


1 B. Awarding damages against defendants, jointly and severally, including
2 disgorgement of all unjust enrichment, for damages suffered as a result of defendants'
3 violation of the securities laws;

4 C. Awarding plaintiff and the Class prejudgment and post-judgment interest,
5 as well as their reasonable attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees and other costs; and,

6 D. Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and
7 proper.

8 DATED: September 26, 2002

9
10 **HAGENS BERMAN LLP**

11
12 By 
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14 1301 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 623-7292

15 Christopher Lovell
16 Christopher J. Gray
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19 Attorneys for Plaintiff
20
21
22
23
24
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26

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS

- 22 -

CERTIFICATION OF NAMED PLAINTIFF
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

I, Ronald R. Wambolt, do hereby certify that:

1. I have reviewed the complaint regarding Avista, Corp. prepared by Lovell & Stewart, LLP, whom I designate as my counsel in this action for all purposes, and I authorize its filing on my behalf.
2. I did not acquire or buy the shares of Avista, Corp. common stock that are the subject of the aforesaid Complaint at the direction of my counsel or in order to participate in any private action arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
3. I am willing to serve as a representative party on behalf of a class of Avista shareholders, including providing testimony at deposition and trial, if necessary.
4. I engaged in the following transaction(s) involving Avista shares:

(Fill in as appropriate)

TRANSACTION (Purchase or sale)	DATE	NUMBER OF SHARES	PRICE PER SHARE
A. Purchase	2/28/00	3,000	29 3/16
B. Sale	4/25/00	800	27.75
C. Sale	11/20/00	2,200	22.75
D.			

5. I am not seeking and have not sought to serve as a representative party on behalf of a class in any other action brought under the federal securities laws that was filed during the three-year period preceding (before) the date of this certification except as indicated below:

(Fill in if you have been or have tried to become lead plaintiff in any other federal securities class actions during the three years before today. If you have not been a party to any class actions, leave blank.)

3Com, Dec 1998

-----Citrix Systems, Jun 2000

I was not selected in either case.

6. I will not accept any payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of the Class beyond my pro rata (based on how much stock I own) share of any recovery, except such reasonable costs and expenses (if any) that I incur directly relating to the representation of the Class and my activities in the lawsuit, as ordered or approved by the Court.

7. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 16 day of July 2002.

 (Signature)

(Title)

11701 Bella Coola Rd. (Address)

Woodway, Wa, 98020